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FEE SHIFTING FOR PTAB PROCEEDINGS
Megan M. La Belle†
Fee shifting in patent litigation has been a hot topic in recent years.
In Octane Fitness v. ICON and Highmark v. Allcare, the Supreme Court
made it easier to shift fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which allows courts to
award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in patent cases.
Moreover, several bills have been introduced in Congress since 2013 that
would expand courts’ power beyond the parameters of § 285. Various
aspects of these proposals have been heavily debated, including whether
fee shifting should be mandatory or discretionary, how to recover fees
from the “real party in interest,” and whether to adopt a one-way or twoway fee shifting scheme.
These sort of design choices regarding a fee shifting regime are
not simply about who should pay for patent litigation. Fee shifting
schemes also provide a roadmap from lawmakers about whether and how
litigation ought to proceed. Fee shifting regimes, in other words, are used
to influence litigation conduct. Thus, if Congress is going to alter the fee
shifting landscape for patent litigation, it must make careful choices in
order to incentivize certain types of patent disputes, while simultaneously
discouraging others.
This Article does not advocate for a new fee shifting regime for
patent litigation, nor does it endeavor to design one. Instead, it focuses on
one narrow but important question about fee shifting in patent cases that
has received surprisingly little attention: whether prevailing parties should
be able to recover attorney’s fees incurred for litigation before the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)—the administrative tribunal of the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office that was created by the America Invents Act
(AIA). With the steep rise in both PTAB proceedings (post-AIA) and fee
motions (post-Octane/Highmark), district courts are bound to face this
question more frequently. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has allowed for the recovery of such fees in the past, the Federal
Circuit’s analysis was flawed in light of Supreme Court precedent. Thus,
this Article proposes that Congress enact legislation allowing parties who
prevail at the PTAB to recover their attorney’s fees.
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Introduction
Patent litigation is notoriously expensive. 1 Although this
sentiment has become somewhat of a cliché, it is nonetheless true.
Depending on the stakes, the median costs for patent litigation range from
$600,000 (for suits worth less than $1 million) to just under $2 million (for
suits worth $10 to $25 million).2 Expert witness fees, document
management and production, and technology-related demonstratives all
contribute to the expense of patent litigation. 3 But most of the money spent
to adjudicate patent disputes is for attorney’s fees. 4
Acknowledging the high cost of patent litigation, Congress
created faster and less expensive administrative procedures for
challenging patents pursuant to the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011—
the most comprehensive patent reform legislation in fifty years. 5 These
new post-grant proceedings are adjudicated at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), a
newly-established tribunal of administrative patent judges. 6 These
administrative proceedings have been far more popular than anyone
anticipated with thousands of petitions for review filed since their
implementation in 2012.7
Another way litigants and courts have attempted to address the
high cost of patent litigation is through fee shifting. Most civil litigation
in the United States is governed by the “American Rule,” meaning that
each party pays his own attorney’s fees. 8 Since the 1940s, however, the
Patent Act has allowed courts to award fees to prevailing patent litigants. 9
Yet, for at least two reasons, fee shifting in patent cases has been relatively
rare over the past half century. First, the patent fee shifting provision only
provides for fees in “exceptional” cases. 10 Second, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the court with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over patent cases—interpreted “exceptional” very narrowly,
making fee awards even harder to come by.11
In recent years, the landscape for fee shifting in patent cases has
started to change. The U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases in 2014,
1

See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV.
1443, 1465 (2014); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 41, 44 (2012); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 77 (2005); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457,
467 (2012).
2
AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2015). Available at
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/econsurvey/2015EconomicSurvey/Pag
es/default.aspx/.
3 Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1485.
4 See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 81 (2012).
5 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
6 Id. §§ 6, 7, 18.
7 See infra Part III (discussing recent widespread use of post-grant administrative
proceedings, particularly inter partes review).
8 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
9
See infra Part II.A (outlining the history of fee shifting in patent cases).
1035 U.S.C. § 285.
11 Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
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Octane Fitness v. ICON and Highmark v. Allcare, that make it easier to
shift fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.12 While it’s too early to know the full
impact of Octane and Highmark, early empirical evidence shows an
increase in fee motions being filed and granted.13 What is more, there are
numerous legislative proposals to broaden fee shifting in patent cases even
further.14 To be sure, those bills have been stalled on Capitol Hill for some
time, but there are indications that patent reform may be back on the table
before long.15
This confluence of events—meaning the passage of the AIA, the
dramatic rise in litigants’ use of PTO administrative proceedings, the
decisions in Octane and Highmark, and Congress’s focus on fee-shifting
in patent cases—makes it likely that courts will more frequently confront
an important question about fee shifting that has received surprisingly little
attention. That question is whether § 285, or the new fee shifting statutes
proposed in Congress, permit prevailing parties in patent cases to recover
attorney’s fees incurred for proceedings before the PTO. While the
Federal Circuit addressed this question almost three decades ago in PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc.,16 the court’s
analysis was flawed in light of Supreme Court precedent. 17 Thus, this
Article calls on the judiciary to revisit PPG, and urges Congress to
explicitly resolve this issue in any new patent fee-shifting legislation under
consideration.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I compares and contrasts
the different fee shifting regimes used in civil litigation in the United
States today, and weighs their costs and benefits. Part II turns to fee
shifting in patent cases, and discusses the history of awarding attorney’s
fees, as well as recent developments in this area from both the judicial and
legislative branches. Part III summarizes the case law addressing the
question whether fees incurred for work before an administrative tribunal
are encompassed by fee shifting provisions. Part III then argues that the
Supreme Court has adopted a clear framework for analyzing such
questions, but that the Federal Circuit failed to apply this well-established
precedent when it decided PPG. Finally, Part IV recommends that either
the Federal Circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court reconsider PPG,
and proposes that Congress enact legislation allowing for the recovery of
attorney’s fees for work before the PTAB.
I.

Civil Litigation and Fee Shifting

The question of who pays attorney’s fees in civil litigation is about
more than money. Fee shifting regimes are designed to shape litigation
conduct, for example by incentivizing certain types of lawsuits and
12

See Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014); and
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
13 See infra note 139 (summarizing the findings of recent post-Octane empirical studies).
14 See infra Part II.D (outlining various legislative proposals to expand fee shifting in patent
cases).
15 See, e.g., Hillary Clinton’s Initiative on Technology and Innovation, The Briefing,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2016/06/27/hillary-clintons-initiativeon-technology-innovation/ (explaining that Hillary Clinton supports patent reform).
16 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
17 See infra Parts III and IV.
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disincentivizing others. The three primary fee shifting regimes utilized in
the United States today—no-way fee shifting, one-way fee shifting, and
two-way fee shifting—reflect different beliefs about the purpose and value
of litigation in our society. 18 The popularity of these fee systems has ebbed
and flowed as attitudes about civil litigation have changed over time.
A. No-Way Fee Shifting
The norm in the United States is that all litigants, win or lose, pay
their own attorney’s fees. 19 A no-way fee shifting regime, or the
“American Rule” as it is often called, has been the general practice in this
country for more than two hundred years. 20 It is hard to say why no-way
fee shifting took root in early America, but scholars have advanced various
theories. Some contend the American Rule evolved from the popular view
of the solitary folk-hero fighting for his rights.21 Others suggest that this
regime—a sharp departure from the British tradition of awarding fees to
prevailing parties—developed because of the anti-British sentiment that
pervaded post-Revolutionary America. 22 Still others claim it was
America’s disdain for lawyers that led to no-way fee shifting; colonists
distrusted lawyers and thus rejected a rule that allowed for the recovery of
fees.23
Whatever the original purpose of no-way fee shifting, today the
rule is justified primarily as a means for increasing access to justice. 24 The
risk of having to pay an opponent’s attorney’s fees may deter wronged
parties from filing meritorious lawsuits. 25 This risk is particularly acute
for low-income litigants whose injuries would likely go unremedied in a
system that shifts fees. 26 The American Rule, in other words, “reflects a
certain wealth consciousness” by helping to level the playing field
between litigants of modest means and the wealthy, large corporations
they are usually suing. 27

18

Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427, 428
(1995); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 652-53 (1982).
19 Rowe, supra note 18, at 651.
20
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
21 Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. P A.
L. REV. 636, 641 (1974). See also Roscoe Pound, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 124
(1921).
22 Id. at 117.
23 Charles Warren, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN B AR 4 (1911). (Another theory is that,
because trials provided a source of entertainment, Americans refused to adopt rules to
discourage them.) See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorney’s Fees for Abuses of the Judicial
System, 61 N.C. L. REV. 613, 616 (1983).
24 Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules:
Reconciling Incentives to Settle With Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1863-64
(1998).
25 Id. at 1864; Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting
in Environmental Litigation and A Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (2004).
26
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (“[T]he
poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”).
27 Sherman, supra note 24, at 1865.

3

FEE SHIFTING FOR PTAB PROCEEDINGS

The unpredictability of civil litigation provides another
justification for our modern system of no-way fee shifting. 28 Estimating
the probability of success in a lawsuit can be difficult, so litigants
shouldn’t be punished for merely asserting a claim or defense. 29 This is
especially true for cases raising novel legal theories and other complex
questions.30 From a societal perspective, novel claims are fundamental
because they allow the law to evolve, adapt, and modernize—for example,
with respect to new technologies—often at a much faster pace than if
lawmaking was left to the legislative body. 31 Thus, the American Rule
facilitates litigation, including litigation of novel legal issues, by
eliminating the risk of having to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees. 32
The American Rule serves important public interests, namely by
making courts more accessible to the less fortunate and creating legal
precedent that develops the law.33 In point of fact, Justice Harlan has
described our fee shifting regime as “an element of due process.” 34 While
some may be unwilling to go that far, the American Rule is unquestionably
a deeply-entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. 35
That does not mean, however, that the American Rule is beyond
reproach; indeed, it has been the subject of much criticism. For one, critics
argue that no-way fee systems fail to make prevailing parties whole. 36 Not
only does this strike many as fundamentally unfair, it contradicts basic
principles of remedies law. 37 Commentators also take issue with the
American Rule for discouraging plaintiffs with low-value claims from

Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (“[S]ince litigation is at best uncertain one should not be
penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit….”).
29 Id.
30 Silecchia, supra note 25, at 8; Mallor, supra note 23, at 618; Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of
the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2014); Hylton, supra note
18, at 439-40.
31 Hylton, supra note 18, at 445-46; Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea
or Placebo?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 418 (1995); Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer,
Enforcing Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 306, 329 (2015) (recognizing that novel legal theories
help develop the law); Daniel J. Solove, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 165-67 (2011) (advocating for a judicial solution to legal issues
involving changing technologies).
32
Comment, supra note 21, at 659.
33 James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 249 (1995); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19
J. L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (describing legal precedent as a “public good”).
34 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
35 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975) (explaining
that American Rule is “deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy”).
36 Michael F. Mayer & Wayne Stix, The Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel Fees, 8
AKRON L. REV. 426 (1975); Rowe, supra note 18, at 657; John F. Vargo, The American
Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1567, 1592 (1993) (American Rule prevents the “little man” from seeking justice in
court).
37 Mayer & Stix, supra note 36, at 426 (“No party in a breach of contract situation…should
be left following the breach with less in hand than he would have had if his adversary had
lived up to his bargain. But…this is precisely what happens under the present cost and
damage structure when litigation occurs.”); Rowe, supra note 18, at 657 (“Undeniably, the
American rule’s effect of reducing a successful plaintiff’s recovery by the amount of his
lawyer’s fee conflicts with the make-whole idea underlying much of the law of remedies.”).
28

4

FEE SHIFTING FOR PTAB PROCEEDINGS

bringing suit since any recovery would be swallowed by attorney’s fees. 38
This is most problematic for impoverished plaintiffs who may not be able
to retain contingency-fee lawyers for cases with little monetary value.39
On the other hand, the American Rule has been impugned for
failing to deter—and even encouraging—frivolous litigation. 40 Because
defendants have to pay their own fees, even when they win on the merits,
settling groundless claims is often less expensive than litigating the case
to judgment. In this way, the argument goes, the American Rule functions
as a sort of “legalized form of blackmail” that clogs our courts and
undermines our justice system.41
These shortcomings of the American Rule have led legislatures
and courts to implement different types of fee-shifting regimes from time
to time. One-way fee shifting, by far the more common exception, awards
fees only to prevailing plaintiffs to address the underenforcement of
socially-valuable claims, while two-way fee shifting aims to make
prevailing parties whole and discourages frivolous litigation.
B. One-Way Fee Shifting
For over a century, exceptions to the American Rule were few and
far between.42 Congress crafted limited exceptions for antitrust, securities,
copyright, and—most relevant to this article—patent cases.43 Courts,
relying on their equitable powers, allowed for the recovery of attorney’s
fees when the losing party acted in bad faith, 44 or when the litigation
benefitted the public, such as cases involving a common fund.45 Because
these exceptions were relatively rare, they received little attention from
courts and commentators.
That changed in the second half of the twentieth century with the
emergence of public law, or public impact, litigation. 46 Public law
38

Mallor, supra note 23, at 616; Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking
Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L.
317, 327 (2005).
39 Id. at 327.
40
Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV.
75, 78 (1964); Michael P. Stone & Thomas J. Miceli, The Impact of Frivolous Lawsuits on
Deterrence: Do They Have Some Redeeming Value?, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 301, 327
(2014) (switching from American rule to English Rule will discourage frivolous lawsuits).
41 Kuenzel, supra note 40, at 78; Mallor, supra note 23, at 617.
42 Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem,
1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 435 (1986).
43 Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 471 (Fed. Circ. 1985) (explaining
that Patent Act was amended in 1946 to add fee-shifting provision); Michael D. Green,
From Here to Attorney’s Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in the Journey to the
Appellate Courts, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 207, 218 (1984) (“Several older statutes, such as the
Clayton Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Copyright Act authorize fee shifting as
well.”).
44 F.D. Rich Co. v. U.S. for Use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
45 John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 849 (1975); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees
From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974). But see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269 (declining
to adopt the “private attorney general” exception to the American Rule in federal court).
46 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41,
48-49 (2012).
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litigation began with structural challenges by public interest groups to
segregated schools and other government institutions.47 But soon the pool
of challengers expanded to individuals who were incentivized by
lawmakers to privately enforce public laws. 48 These so-called “private
attorney generals” were incentivized, of course, by the prospect of
recovering damages in many cases. Even more important were the oneway fee shifting provisions included in civil rights and environmental
legislation that entitled only prevailing plaintiffs to attorney’s fees. 49
The idea behind one-way fee shifting is relatively straightforward.
Certain areas of substantive law—civil rights, environmental, and
consumer protection, for example—are socially valuable, and so
enforcement is particularly important. 50 While government agencies
police and enforce such laws, limited resources and personnel mean that
some violators go unpunished. 51 One alternative is for private citizens
(and their lawyers) to step in and fill that gap. But for that to work, the
potential benefits of litigation must outweigh its costs. 52 Various means
could be used in an attempt to tip the scales in favor of litigation.
Lawmakers could provide for enhanced damages, lower the plaintiff’s
burden of proof, increase the availability of class relief, or allow third
parties to finance litigation.53 For the most part, though, legislatures have
opted instead for fee-shifting rules that advantage plaintiffs.
By the 1990s, there were over 2,000 fee shifting statutes in the
United States, the vast majority of which operate one way in favor of
plaintiffs.54 The general consensus is that these laws have worked as
intended, meaning they have improved—although certainly not

47

Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (“Structural reform is premised on the notion that the
quality of our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of large-scale
organizations, not just by individuals acting either beyond or within these organizations.”).
48 La Belle, supra note 46, at 48-49.
49 Rowe, supra note 18, at 662-63.
50 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (civil rights suits); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1365 (d); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1988); Equal Access to Justice Act,
5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988). (Some of these Acts provide for one-way fee shifting on their face,
while others have been interpreted by courts—based on legislative history—to sometimes
allow fee shifting only in favor of prevailing plaintiffs). See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Razore v. Tulalip Tribes
of Washington, 66 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Paul Taylor, The Difference Between
Filing Lawsuits and Selling Widgets: The Lost Understanding That Some Attorneys'
Exercise of State Power Is Subject to Appropriate Regulation, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 45, 58
(2005) (“By the 1980’s, the Supreme Court went even further by reading one-way feeshifting statutes broadly and encouraging enforcement under such statutes in a way that
tended to grant fees to prevailing plaintiffs while denying them to prevailing defendants.”).
51 See Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (2014);
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2002).
52 See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2048-50
(1993) [hereinafter Krent, Explaining] (“[F]ee shifting may…be an effective way for
Congress to deter wrongdoing or, in other words, to improve the primary conduct of both
the government and private firms.”).
53 Id. at 2048-49, 2048 n.39; Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic
Implications of Third-Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 645, 645 (2012).
54 Vargo, supra note 36, at 1629; Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea or
Placebo?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 416 (1995).
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perfected—access to justice for plaintiffs.55 Indeed, some commentators
believe that one-way fee shifting works too well in that it facilitates
frivolous claims along with meritorious ones.56 As a result, defendants
subject to one-way fee-shifting provisions are often forced to settle
meritless suits because litigating is just too risky. 57
On the flip side, one-way fee shifting is criticized for having a
dampening effect on settlement. Simply put, the rule may discourage
settlement because plaintiffs have little to lose and much to gain from
litigating to judgment. 58 For this criticism to be persuasive, we must
suppose that settlement is the ultimate goal; that it’s always the best way
to resolve litigation. Yet, in some cases—particularly the type of public
law litigation where one-way fee shifting is used—adjudicating to final
judgment is a better solution than settling. 59 Thus, by discouraging
settlement, one-way fee shifting is arguably working exactly how
intended.
As quickly as support for one-way fee shifting grew in the 1960s
and 1970s, the momentum faded by the end of the twentieth century.
Where lawmakers, courts, and the public once favored fee shifting that
spurs litigation,60 the focus moved to fee shifting that hampers litigation.
There was supposedly a “litigation explosion” plaguing our judicial
system that two-way fee shifting would help fix.61

See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 741 (1986) (finding that “the Fees Act has given the
victims of civil rights violations a powerful weapon that improves their ability to employ
counsel, to obtain access to the courts, and thereafter to vindicate their rights by means of
settlement or trial”); Jack B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in A Diverse Mass Society, 8
J.L. & POL’Y 385, 390 (2000) (“There are many grounds for pride in our successes in
opening up the adjudication system to all…includ[ing]…statutes...providing for fee
shifting….”). But see Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717,
721-22 (2010) (“The overall impact of…fee-shifting statutes on access to justice has been
limited at best….”).
56 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. P A. L. REV. 519, 587 n. 211
(1997); Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney's Fees Clauses: A Proposal to Shift to the
Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 108 (2012); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the
Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 153 (1984).
57
See, e.g., Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1971) (“Onesided attorney's fees clauses can thus be used as instruments of oppression to force
settlements of dubious or unmeritorious claims.”).
58 Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by
Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2015) (“[B]ecause [fee-shifting]
amplifies the parties’ relative optimism and degree of information asymmetry, fee-shifting
discourages settlement under most economic models.”); Robert S. Miller, Attorneys' Fees
for Contractual Non-Signatories Under California Civil Code Section 1717: A Remedy in
Search of a Rationale, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 535, 541 (1995).
59 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
60 See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 760 (2010)
(scholars commonly argue that one-way fee shifting “increase[s] the overall number of
actions filed”). But see Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 585, 593 (6th ed.
2003) (“[O]ne-way indemnity may not even generate more litigation than the American
(no-indemnity) rule does.”).
61
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 985 (2003); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform
as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 829 (1993).
55
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C. Two-Way Fee Shifting
The claim that the U.S. justice system was in crisis and was
suffering from a litigation explosion became ubiquitous by the late
1980s.62 Politicians, big companies, and the popular media subscribed to
the notion that overly litigious plaintiffs (and their lawyers) were
burdening our courts and needed to be reined in.63 Though little empirical
evidence supported these allegations, 64 the Bush administration joined the
chorus and called for litigation reform.65 To this end, then-Vice President
Dan Quayle was appointed to lead the Council on Competitiveness, an
organization committed to protecting American business interests. 66
After conducting hearings, the Quayle Council published its
Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in 1991.67 Among its many proposals
was the recommendation that two-way fee shifting, or the English Rule,
be implemented in federal diversity suits.68 A “loser pays” rule arguably
reduces the number of baseless lawsuits, encourages meritorious ones, and
makes prevailing parties whole. 69 Moreover, parties subject to two-way
fee shifting are less likely to engage in excessive discovery and motion
practice.70
This movement toward the English system gained some traction
in the 1990s. Not only was the public’s interest in the topic piqued, 71
lawmakers gave it serious consideration too. A loser pays bill passed the
House of Representatives,72 Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act with a two-way fee shifting provision, 73 and a few
states adopted loser pays statutes for certain types of civil suits. 74 With
time, however, the fervor for fee shifting waned due in part to the Clinton
Administration’s opposition to loser pay rules as “tilt[ing] the legal
playing field dramatically to the disadvantage of consumers and middle-

62

See, e.g., Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
199 (1991).
63 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Md. L. Rev.
1093, 1094-95 (1996); Miller, supra note 61, at 985-86.
64 Galanter, supra note 63, at 1098.
65 Symposium on Civil Justice Reform: Forward, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (1993).
66 Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 627-28 (2010).
67 Id. at 628.
68 Mark S. Stein, Is One-Way Fee Shifting Fairer than Two-Way Fee Shifting?, 141 F.R.D.
351, 351 (1992).
69 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 525 (1994) (“The most common reason
advanced in support of the dual approach is that, by awarding attorney's fees to prevailing
plaintiffs as a matter of course, it encourages litigation of meritorious claims of copyright
infringement.”); Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1161, 1161 (1996).
70 Olson & Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1162.
71 Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea or Placebo?, 71 Chi-Kent L. Rev.
415, 415 (1995).
72 141 Cong. Rec. H2749-02 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (Roll Call Vote No. 207).
73 15 U.S.C. §§77z-1(c), 78u-4(c) (2000).
74 Olson & Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1175-80.
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class citizens.”75 This is especially true for those plaintiffs relying on
contingency fee arrangements.76
For the past two decades, civil litigation reform has taken a
different course. The judiciary—the Supreme Court in particular—has
addressed topics ranging from pleading standards to class certification to
arbitration clauses to personal jurisdiction. 77 The Court’s decisions on all
these matters are considered “pro-defendant,” in that they make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to sue.78 So while widespread two-way fee shifting
failed to take root in the U.S., the landscape of our civil litigation system
has been transformed nonetheless.
Despite these substantial changes, there have been calls for further
reform with respect to patent litigation. 79 Similar to the rhetoric of the late
twentieth century, critics say we have a patent litigation “crisis” or
“explosion” on our hands. 80 They claim that this crisis has been caused
primarily by patent assertion entities (PAEs), more pejoratively known as
“patent trolls,” which are companies that own and enforce patents, but do
not practice them. 81 PAEs—much like the supposedly overly-litigious
plaintiffs of the early 1990s—rely heavily on contingency fee
arrangements.82 Thus, numerous bills have been introduced in Congress
to overhaul the way patent cases are litigated.83 Although the Patent Act
already allows for fee-shifting in exceptional cases, 84 many of these bills
feature robust fee shifting provisions.
II.

Fee Shifting in Patent Cases

Two-way fee shifting is rare in the United States, yet has been
available in patent cases for the past seventy years. That said, Congress
intended fee shifting to be invoked only in a small subset of patent cases.
Courts have heeded that advice, limiting fee shifting in some
circumstances perhaps even more than Congress had expected. The
questions now facing Congress are whether the time has come to re-tool
the patent fee shifting statute to make it broader and, if so, what that new
statute should look like.
75

53 Cong. Q. 744, 745 (Mar. 11, 1995) (quoting letter from Attorney General Janet Reno
and White House Counsel Abner J. Mikva to House Speaker Newt Gingrich).
76
Mallor, supra note 23, at 618 (“Even a litigant who had a contingent fee arrangement
with his own attorney would be deterred from filing suit; this would cancel the benefit of
the contingency fee as a means of financing litigation for litigants of modest means.”).
77 Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV.
465, 471-72 (2012).
78 Id. at 472-74.
79 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 281 (2015).
80 See, e.g., Dan L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can
Solve It, 23 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 1 (2009); James Bessen & Michael J.
Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 402 (2013).
81 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths,
and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1571, 1573-74 (2009).
82
See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation,
64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 355-56 (2012).
83 Gugliuzza, supra note 79, at 281.
84 35 U.S.C. § 285.
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A. History of § 285
Historically, patent cases were governed by the American Rule
like most other types of civil suits. 85 That changed in 1946 when Congress
amended the Patent Act to provide for two-way fee shifting. The purpose
of this new law was two-fold. First, Congress believed it would deter
willful infringement “by anyone thinking that all he would be required to
pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty.”86 Second, two-way fee shifting
would “enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged
infringer.”87
The original patent fee shifting statute, then-codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 70, stated that a court “may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment in any patent
case.”88 On its face, the statute lacked guidance about when to award fees.
But the legislative history and cases interpreting § 70 make clear that fee
shifting was reserved for “extraordinary circumstances,” such as cases
involving inequitable conduct or vexatious litigation. 89
The Patent Act of 1952 amended the fee shifting statute and
recodified it at 35 U.S.C. § 285, where it remains in the same form today.
Section 285, in its entirety, provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 90 While the
language differed from the 1946 version, Congress did not intend to
change the substance of the statute.91 Instead, this was a clarifying
amendment to “expres[s] the intention of the [1946] statute as shown by
its legislative history and as interpreted by the courts.” 92 Thus, in the
decades after recodification—just as in the years before—district courts
interpreted and applied the patent fee shifting statute in a discretionary
manner, considering the totality of the circumstances and deciding
whether a particular case was “exceptional” to warrant fees. 93
Although the 1952 Act did not change the way courts approached
fee shifting, it overhauled many other features of the patent system. 94 The
Act strengthened patent owners’ rights, ultimately leading to more
applications at the PTO and more issued patents. 95 At the same time,
85

Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014).
S. Rep. No. 1503 (1946), in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1386, 1387.
87 Id.
88 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946 ed.).
89 See Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 1951);
Park-in-Theaters, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir. 1951); S. Rep. No. 1503
(1946), in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1386, 1387.
90 35 U.S.C. § 285.
91 Octane, 134 S.Ct. at 1753; 1 PATENT LAW C ODIFICATION & REVISION 77, 108-09 (1952).
92 Id. at 1753 n.2.
93 Id. at 1753.
94 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 19002000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2221-24 (2000).
95 Id. (discussing how the 1952 Act benefitted patent owners); Craig Allen Nard, American
Patent Law With European and TRIPS Comparative Perspectives, (“The 1952 Act did a
great deal to strengthen our patent system”); James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff, Anything
Under the Sun Made by Humans: Patent Law Doctrines As Endogenous Institutions for
Commercializing Innovation, 62 EMORY L.J. 967, 971 n.15 (2013) (“Diverse jurists
immediately recognized the power of the 1952 Act in strengthening patents….”).
86
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courts were invalidating patents at very high rates,96 and the circuits were
sharply divided on many substantive patent law doctrines. 97 This fracture
among the courts created a sense of unfairness, generated instability, and
promoted forum shopping in patent cases. 98 In an effort to address these
deficiencies, Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1982.99
B.

The Federal Circuit’s Approach to Fee Shifting

The primary purpose of the Federal Circuit was to bring greater
uniformity to patent law. 100 The idea was that a “single court of appeals
for patent cases [would] promote certainty,”101 and so the Federal Circuit
was granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction over most patent-related
cases. Commentators generally agree that the Federal Circuit has taken
this congressional mandate to heart, and patent doctrine has become more
uniform over the past three decades. 102
One way the Federal Circuit has accomplished this uniformity
goal is by preferring bright-line rules to more flexible standards. 103 There
is a rich literature discussing this trend in the Federal Circuit and the
impact it has had on patent law. 104 The court adopted such bright-line rules
for patentable subject matter, obviousness, declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, and permanent injunctions, to name just a few. 105
The Federal Circuit’s proclivity toward bright-line rules is
similarly apparent in its fee shifting jurisprudence. As noted above, for a
long time after the 1952 Act, district courts decided exceptionalism for fee
shifting purposes under a totality of the circumstances test. 106 But that
96

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206 n.53 (1998) (reporting that in the 1970s, only about thirtyfive percent of litigated patents were held valid).
97 David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and
Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 468 (2013).
98 See Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Comm'n on Revision of the
Fed. Court Appellate Sys. Structure & Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change
(1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (“[D]isparity in results in different circuits leads
to widespread forum shopping….[which] ‘demeans the entire judicial process and the
patent system as well.’”); Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47
AZ. ST. L.J. 63, 83-84 (2015).
99 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25.
100 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (“Patent litigation long has been identified as a
problem area, characterized by undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistency in
adjudications.”); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The creation of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of the law. Such
uniformity will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation.”).
101 H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 23.
102 Megan M. La Belle, Local Rules, supra note 97, at 84.
103 Taylor, supra note 96 at 478.
104 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); David
O. Taylor, supra note 96 at 468-69; John R. Thomas, Formalism and Antiformalism in
Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 468 (2013); John
R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 794 (2003).
105 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 136 (2010) (patentable subject matter); KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (obviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (declaratory judgment jurisdiction); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (permanent injunctions).
106 Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753.
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changed in 2005 when the Federal Circuit rejected this well-established,
malleable standard in Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.107
The accused infringer in Brooks Furniture sought a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement and invalidity with respect to a design patent
for rocking chair trim.108 The district court granted summary judgment of
noninfringement, determined the case was exceptional under § 285, and
awarded attorney’s fees. 109 The court awarded fees because it believed the
patent owner’s litigation tactics were inappropriate and its infringement
position was frivolous. 110
The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal and announced a new rule
for deciding whether a case is exceptional under § 285. Cases are
exceptional, the court explained, in only two circumstances. 111 First,
“when there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the
matter in litigation.”112 Such conduct might include willful infringement,
fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during
litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, or conduct that violates
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.113
Second, a case may be deemed exceptional if the litigation was
brought in subjective bad faith and the litigation is objectively baseless. A
prevailing defendant must prove, in other words, that the plaintiff actually
knew the litigation was objectively basis.114 And the defendant can only
do that, the Federal Circuit pronounced, with clear and convincing
evidence because “[t]here is a presumption that the assertion of
infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith.” 115 Applying
this new test, the court reversed the fee award in Brooks Furniture because
the accused infringer could not prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the patent owner knew its case was objectively baseless. 116
Like in Brooks Furniture, prevailing defendants in patent cases
generally have struggled to recover attorney’s fees. 117 A recent study by
Saurabh Vishnubhakat analyzed over 200 fee awards from 2003-2013 and
found that only 29% of the fee awards that are granted go to defendants,
with 71% going to plaintiffs.118 Notably, however, Vishnubhakat found
that in the rare instances when defendants were awarded fees, the median
107

See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
108
Id. at 1379-80.
109 Id. at 1380.
110 Id. at 1382.
111 Id. at 1381-82.
112 Id. at 1381.
113 Id.
114 iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit
in iLOR also clarified that “objectively baseless” means “so unreasonable that no
reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed.” Id. at 1378.
115 Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1382.
116 Id. at 1385.
117 See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 81 tbl. 6 (2012) (finding that 68% of fee awards were to plaintiffs
and 32% to defendants); Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation,
18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 59, 87-88 (2013) (finding that 68% of fee awards were to plaintiffs
and 32% to defendants); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really
Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 15, 25 (2014) (finding that 71% of fee awards were to
plaintiffs and 29% to defendants).
118 Id.
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amounts were much higher than for plaintiffs.119 The study further
concludes that fee awards vary by district and based on the underlying
technology.120
Though difficult to prove empirically, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule in Brooks Furniture is
one of the reasons that fee awards for defendants have been so elusive. In
some cases, district courts refused to award fees because the Brooks
Furniture framework was not met,121 while in others the district court
awarded fees only to be reversed by the Federal Circuit. 122 As with many
areas of patent law, commentators called for reform and the Supreme
Court stepped in.123
C. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Fee Shifting
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided two cases—Octane Fitness
LLC v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc. and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.—that have turned the tide for fee shifting in patent
cases. Octane addressed the question of what makes a case “exceptional”
under § 285, while Highmark addressed the standard that appellate courts
should use in reviewing fee decisions. Consistent with recent trends in
the patent space,124 the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in both
cases.
Octane involved a patent dispute over an elliptical exercise
machine.125 ICON, the patent owner, sued Octane for infringement in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. After prevailing on a
motion for summary judgment based on noninfringement, Octane sought
attorney’s fees. 126 The court denied the fee motion under the Brooks
Furniture rule, finding that ICON’s claim was neither objectively baseless
nor brought in subjective bad faith. 127 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
affirmed rejecting Octane’s argument that the Brooks Furniture rule was
“overly restrictive.”128
The Supreme Court granted Octane’s petition for certiorari and
reversed, explaining that the Brooks Furniture framework is “unduly
rigid” and “encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district
courts.”129 In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the plain
language of § 285, which simply requires that a case be “exceptional” to
warrant a fee award. Because the Patent Act does not define

119

Id.
Id. at 26-29.
121 See, e.g., Octane, 134 S.Ct. at 1755.
122 See, e.g., Highmark, 134 S.Ct. at 1747.
123 See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Op-Ed, Making Patent
Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25.
124 See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship
With the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275, 278-82 (2012)
(discussing trends in the Supreme Court’s patent opinions).
125 Octane, 134 S.Ct. at 1754.
126
Id. at 1755.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
120
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“exceptional,” the Court ascribed the term its ordinary meaning:
uncommon, rare, or not ordinary. 130
Thus, the Court held, a case is exceptional under § 285 as long as
it “stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was
litigated.”131 The Court went on to say that lower courts should decide
exceptionalism on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the
circumstances.132 Hence, Octane—like many other recent Supreme Court
patent decisions—rejected the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule for a more
flexible standard.
Highmark, the companion case to Octane, addressed the
appropriate standard of review for fee shifting decisions. Highmark, Inc.,
a health insurance company, filed an action in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas against Allcare Health, the owner of a patent
covering “utilization review” in managed health care systems.133
Highmark sought a declaratory judgment that Allcare’s patent was invalid,
unenforceable, and not infringed, and Allcare counterclaimed for
infringement.134 The district court entered summary judgment of
noninfringement in favor of Highmark.
Highmark then filed a motion for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285. The district court determined that the case was exceptional because
Allcare engaged in “vexatious” and “deceitful” litigation conduct, and
pursued infringement claims despite its own experts demonstrating that
such claims lacked merit.135 Accordingly, the district court granted the
motion and awarded Highmark more than $5 million in fees. 136 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit—applying a de novo standard of review—reversed the
exceptional case determination with respect to one of the patent claims in
issue.137
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Highmark and once again
reversed the Federal Circuit. Relying on Octane, the Court held that the
question whether a case is “exceptional” is committed to the discretion of
the district court. 138 Thus, the Court explained, all aspects of the § 285
determination are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion, not de
novo as was the Federal Circuit’s practice. 139
Taken together, Octane and Highmark have the potential to shift
the landscape of patent litigation. While it’s still too soon to understand
the full impact of these cases, early studies suggest that parties are bringing
fee motions at higher rates, courts are more willing to grant them, and
accused infringers are more likely to recover than in the pre-Octane era.140
130

Id. at 1756.
Id.
132 Id.
133 134 S.Ct. at 1747.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138
Id. at 1748.
139 Id. at 1749.
140 See, e.g., Hannah Jiam, Fee Shifting and Octane Fitness: An Empirical Approach
Toward Understanding “Exceptionalsim,” 30 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 611, 623, 630 (2015)
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Whatever changes they ultimately achieve, Octane and Highmark are
probably not a panacea for the problems supposedly plaguing our patent
litigation system.141 Consequently, reformers continue to advocate for a
broader fee-shifting statute for patent cases.
D. Legislative Proposals for Fee Shifting
Congress passed the America Invents Act, the most significant
overhaul to the U.S. patent system in over half a century, in 2011.142 Yet,
less than two years later, calls for further reform began. More than a dozen
bills were introduced in Congress between 2013 and 2015, many of which
included fee shifting provisions.143 The fee provisions in these bills varied.
Some were one-way awarding fees only to the accused infringer, while
others were two-way allowing either prevailing party to recover. 144
Certain of these bills targeted PAEs, while others drew no distinctions
based on the identity of the parties.145
This legislative effort culminated with two leading bills emerging
from the House and the Senate. The Innovation Act—the House version
of the bill—and the Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship
(PATENT) Act—the Senate version of the bill—contain relatively similar
fee shifting provisions. 146 Although a detailed analysis of these provisions
is beyond the scope of this Article, a few key points should be highlighted.
First, the bills are two-way, meaning a court may award fees to
either a prevailing patent owner or accused infringer.147 Second, both bills
make fee shifting mandatory unless the court finds that (1) the losing
party’s position and conduct was reasonable, or (2) special circumstances
(e.g., undue economic hardship) would make an award unjust. 148 Third,
the bills contemplate the joinder of interested parties to facilitate the
recovery of fees.149 Fourth, the bills include exceptions for universities
and certain technology transfer organizations. 150 Finally, and most

(finding that the number of fees motion has risen and courts are more likely to grant those
motions post Octane); Mallun Yen, Fee-Shifting Before and After the Supreme Court
Decisions, INSIDE COUNSEL, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/02/25/fee-shiftingbefore-and-after-the-supreme-court-de (Feb. 25, 2015) (finding that accused infringers are
winning fee awards at higher rates than before Octane).
141 See, e.g., Eric Coe, Collecting Fees Still Tough After Octane, Highmark Cases, LAW
360 (Aug. 28, 2015) (discussing the limitations on fee shifting even after Octane and
Highmark); Yen, supra note 139 (“reformers assert that fee-shifting won’t be truly
effective without further legislation”).
142 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
143 See Patent Progress, Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation,
available at http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patentprogresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (collecting and summarizing patent reform bills
that have been introduced since 2013); Gugliuzza, supra note 79, at 281 (discussing various
bills and their provisions).
144 Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1493-94.
145 Id.
146 Innovation Act, H.R. 9 (2015); PATENT Act, S. 1137 (2015).
147
H.R. 9, § 3(b); S. 1137 § 7(b).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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pertinent to this Article, both bills allow for the recovery of fees incurred
“in connection with a civil action.”151
What neither the Innovation Act nor the PATENT Act (nor any
other bill for that matter) clarifies is what it means to incur fees “in
connection with a civil action.” Does that only include fees for work
before the district court? Or does it also include fees for proceedings
conducted before an administrative body, namely the PTO? In light of the
steep rise in the use of PTO proceedings since the AIA, 152 these are
important questions to answer.
III.

Fee Shifting for Administrative Proceedings

The AIA effected major changes in American patent law. Our
priority system switched from a first-to-invent to first-to-file,153 the
definition of prior art expanded,154 and the ability to join defendants in
patent suits was restricted.155 Perhaps the most substantial change,
however, was the creation of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)
and various administrative proceedings for challenging patent validity at
the PTO.156 Though the PTO conducted post-grant proceedings before the
AIA, Congress designed the new proceedings—including inter partes
review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered business method
review (CBM)—so they would be more effective for litigants. 157 That is
to say, Congress hoped to encourage the use of PTAB proceedings as a
means of streamlining and reducing the cost of patent litigation. 158
PTAB proceedings, it turns out, are far more popular than anyone
anticipated.159 Between September 16, 2012 (when the AIA became
effective) and June 30, 2016, 5,202 PTAB petitions were filed (4,704
IPRs, 469 CBMs, and 29 PGRs).160 Early data show that challengers are
enjoying high rates of success at the PTAB, meaning that a significant
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Id.
See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 93 (2014) (“In the roughly two years since
inter partes review… replaced inter partes reexamination, petitioners have filed almost
two thousand requests for the Patent Trial and Appeal Board…to review the validity of
issued US patents.”).
153 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note __, § 3.
154 Id.
155 Id. § 19 at 331-33.
156 Id. §§ 6, 7, 18 at 299-316, 329-31.
157 Id. §§ 6, 18. For example, PTAB proceedings are resolved much faster than their
predecessors, the estoppel provisions are more forceful, and there are additional procedural
protections, including the right to discovery and an oral hearing. Id. §§ 6, 18.
158 See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of
II, 21 FED. CIR B.J. 539, 653 (2012).
159 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit A Run for Its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 251 (2015) (“[T]hese
statistics speak loudly about the public’s eagerness and ability to use these procedures to
‘weed out’ bad patents….”).
160
United States Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-2-29%20PTAB.pdf
(Feb. 29, 2016). PGR applies only to those patents issued under the new first-to-file
system, and very few first-to-file patents have been issued so far.
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percentage of patent claims have been cancelled.161 There is also evidence
that the vast majority of PTAB proceedings involve parallel district court
litigation.162 The popularity of these proceedings has led some critics to
refer to the PTAB as a “death squad”163 and “killing field.”164 Other
commentators claim the PTAB is simply doing what Congress intended:
eliminating bad patents. 165
Without wading into this debate, what’s clear is that patent owners
and accused infringers alike are expending significant resources, including
attorney’s fees, on PTAB proceedings. The median cost of IPR, for
example, is $275,000 through the PTAB hearing or $350,000 if appealed
to the Federal Circuit.166 So, if a prevailing party in a patent litigation is
entitled to recover reasonable expenses and fees, does that include fees for
work before the PTO? Notably, this question is not one of first impression
for the Federal Circuit, as the court addressed it almost three decades ago
in PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc. in the context
of pre-AIA administrative proceedings. 167 The decision in PPG, which I
argue is flawed, is explored below in Subsection C. Before addressing
PPG, however, this Part provides a summary of the Supreme Court’s and
other Circuit Courts’ jurisprudence on fee shifting for administrative
proceedings outside of the patent context.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a substantial expansion of the
administrative state with the creation of agencies like the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), among many others. 168 Concomitantly,
Congress was enacting civil rights and environmental legislation that
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Love & Ambwani, supra note 151, at 101-02. A more recent study shows that, since
2012, the rate at which the PTAB is invalidating claims has slowly and consistently
declined. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai, & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making
in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 45, 78 (2016).
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are also being litigated in federal court).
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Invalid?,
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(Mar.
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2014),
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164 Erich Spangenberg, Patent Predictions for 2015, IPNAV BLOG (Jan. 2015), available at
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165 See Ryan Davis, PTAB’s “Death Squad” Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW
360 (Aug. 14, 2014) (quoting the former Chief Judge of the PTAB, James Smith, as saying
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ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015 38 (2015).
167 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
168 See Kristen Hickman & Richard Pierce, Jr., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2010).
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included fee shifting provisions to encourage enforcement of these new
rights.169 It comes as no surprise, then, that courts soon faced the question
whether prevailing parties—absent explicit guidance from Congress—
may recover attorney’s fees for work performed before administrative
tribunals.
1. Fee Shifting in Civil Rights Cases
Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases
addressing this question in the civil rights context. The first case, New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,170 involved a plaintiff who claimed she
was denied a position as a cocktail waitress because of her race. 171 As
required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff Carey filed a
complaint with the EEOC, and the EEOC referred her complaint to the
New York State Division of Human Rights (“Division”). 172 The Division
found probable cause that Carey had been unlawfully discriminated
against and, after a hearing, ordered New York Gaslight Club (“Club”) to
offer her employment and pay back wages.173
While the Club appealed the Division’s decision, Carey pursued
her EEOC charge. Relying largely on the Division’s findings, the EEOC
also found probable cause and issued Carey a right to sue letter. 174 Carey
then filed suit under Title VII in federal district court in New York seeking
damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. 175 Soon after filing the
federal action, the Division’s decision was affirmed on appeal and the
Club agreed to comply with the Division’s order.176 Thus, the only issue
remaining for the court was Carey’s request for attorney’s fees, the vast
majority of which were incurred for work before the Division and
EEOC.177 The district court refused to award Carey fees, the Second
Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 178
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit holding that
Carey was entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in connection with
the administrative proceedings. The Court began its analysis with the
language of the relevant fee shifting provision, section 706(k) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Section 706(k) provided that “[i]n any action or
proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”179 The fact that the statute
referred not only to “action” but to “proceeding” was critically important
to the Court. “The words of § 706(k) leave little doubt that fee awards are
authorized for legal work done in ‘proceedings’ other than court
169

See supra Part I.B.
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actions.”180 This is particularly true where, as here, the administrative
proceedings in question were mandatory. 181
What is more, the Carey Court opined, this plain language
interpretation of § 706(k) is supported by the legislative history. Allowing
a prevailing plaintiff like Carey to recover fees for administrative
proceedings furthers the objective of § 706(k), namely to “facilitate the
bringing of discrimination complaints.” 182 A contrary rule would force
victims of discrimination to bear the costs of mandatory administrative
proceedings, which no doubt would deter the enforcement of many
meritorious civil rights claims. 183
The second case in the trilogy—Webb v. Dyer County Board of
Education—presented a similar set of facts as Carey, but involved a
different statutory scheme.184 Leonard Webb, a schoolteacher, claimed he
was terminated on the basis of his race and pursued administrative
remedies as provided by Tennessee law. After several hearings, the Board
of Education of Dyer County, Tennessee, upheld Webb’s dismissal.185
Webb then filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of civil rights laws and the constitution. The lawsuit ultimately
settled with a consent order pursuant to which Webb was reinstated to his
former teaching position and awarded $15,400 in damages. 186 Webb
subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1988, seeking to recover, inter alia, fees incurred during the administrative
proceedings.187 The district court rejected Webb’s request for such fees,
the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.188
This time, the Court refused to allow the plaintiff to recover fees
for time spent in administrative proceedings. As in Carey, the Court
started with the relevant statutory language and found that § 1988, like §
706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, authorizes an award of attorney’s fees in
“any action or proceeding to enforce a provision” of this title. 189 The
Court nonetheless distinguished Carey on the grounds that the
administrative proceedings in that case were mandatory. Webb, on the
other hand, was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before
suing under § 1983; the administrative proceedings Webb pursued were
optional.190
The Court then explained that work completed during
optional administrative proceedings might be compensable if it was “both
useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance” the litigation. 191
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Because Webb failed to make such a showing, the district court properly
denied fees.192
North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street
Community Council, Inc. is the third case in the civil rights trilogy. 193 In
Crest, the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the U.S.
Department of Transportation challenging a plan to build a federallyfunded highway through a predominantly black neighborhood as violative
of Title VI of the civil rights laws. 194 The parties settled the administrative
dispute, and plaintiff subsequently filed an action in federal court
exclusively to recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the courts of appeal were split
on the question whether such an independent action for fees is
sustainable.195
In a decision that has drawn significant criticism,196 the Court held
that plaintiffs could not file a separate lawsuit under § 1988 to recover fees
incurred during administrative proceedings. The Court read literally the
language of § 1988, which allows for the recovery of fees for “any action
or proceeding to enforce a provision of 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title.”197 Because a separate action for fees did not seek
to enforce any of these laws, § 1988 was not satisfied. The Court defended
this conclusion saying that it is “entirely reasonable to limit the award of
attorney’s fees to those parties who, in order to obtain relief, found it
necessary to file a complaint in court.” 198 Moreover, the Court reasoned,
this rule should incentivize potential civil rights defendants to resolve
disputes quickly instead of risking a lawsuit and liability for attorney’s
fees.199
2. Fee Shifting in Environmental Cases
Around the same time the Supreme Court was deciding the civil
rights trilogy, it confronted a similar issue in an environmental case,
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air.200 In
Delaware Valley, a public interest group filed a suit in federal court to
compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to implement a vehicle
emission inspection and maintenance program (I/M Program) as required
by the Clean Air Act (CAA). 201 The parties entered into a consent decree
pursuant to which Pennsylvania agreed to establish an I/M Program for
192
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several counties in the state. 202 However, implementation of the program
did not proceed smoothly, and Delaware Valley pursued proceedings at
the EPA to enforce the consent decree.203 As a result, the parties
negotiated a new compliance schedule.
Delaware Valley then moved for attorney’s fees to recoup the
money it spent during the EPA proceedings. 204 The district court granted
the motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed relying on the “useful and
ordinarily necessary” standard of Webb.205 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and affirmed the lower courts on this issue. In so doing, the
Court began with the language of the relevant fee shifting statute, as it had
in Casey and Webb.206 Unlike § 706(k) and § 1988, however, the fee
shifting provision of the CAA, § 304(d), explicitly referred only to the
“action” not to “proceedings.”207 But, the Court decided, the statutory
language alone was not determinative of Congress’s intent. Instead, the
Court looked to the legislative history of the CAA and found that it used
the terms “action” and “proceedings” interchangeably. 208 More to the
point, because § 304(d) had the same objective as §§ 706(k) and 1988—
“to promote citizen enforcement of important federal policies”—their fee
shifting provisions should carry the same meaning. 209
After addressing the plain language and legislative history of §
304(d), the Court turned to the mandatory/optional nature of the
administrative proceedings.210 While the administrative proceedings in
question were optional, the Court agreed that the work before the EPA was
“useful and necessary” as contemplated by Webb. Put simply,
“participation in these administrative proceedings was crucial to the
vindication of Delaware Valley’s rights under the consent decree.” 211
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding fees
to the plaintiff in this case.
Piecing together the holdings of Carey, Webb, Crest, and
Delaware Valley, a framework emerges for deciding whether a prevailing
party may recover attorney’s fees incurred before an administrative
agency.212 First, the plaintiff must file a lawsuit to enforce the underlying
rights, not an independent action solely to recover attorney’s fees. Second,
the court must determine if either the plain language of the fee shifting
statute or its legislative history make clear that Congress contemplated
fees for “proceedings,” not just lawsuits. Finally, the court must determine
if the administrative proceedings at issue were mandatory or optional.
202
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Whereas a prevailing party is presumptively entitled to fees for mandatory
proceedings, fees for optional proceedings are only recoverable if they
were both “useful and ordinarily necessary” to advance the litigation. 213
B. Lower Courts’ Interpretation of Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Fee shifting provisions are found in many different laws, and
therefore lower courts have faced the question whether to include fees for
work before an administrative tribunal in a number of contexts. Examples
include the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act (HCPA), 214 the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 215 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).216 Courts have generally
allowed the recovery of such fees in HCPA cases, 217 precluded recovery
in ERISA cases, 218 and split on the issue in ADEA cases. 219 A lengthy
discussion of all of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, so it
addresses only the ERISA cases—which were decided most recently—in
greater detail.
Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund for Northern California
was the first circuit decision in the ERISA context to address the question
whether a prevailing party could recover attorney’s fees for administrative
proceedings.220 Cann filed two federal lawsuits and pursued administrative
remedies regarding his pension eligibility. 221 Upon settling the merits,
Cann requested $51,600 in attorney’s fees, some of which were incurred
during administrative proceedings. 222 Cann argued that he was entitled to
recover such fees because the administrative proceedings were mandatory,
i.e., exhaustion of administrative remedies was a prerequisite to filing
suit.223 The district court nevertheless limited Cann’s recovery to fees
incurred during the federal court actions.
Following the framework set out by the Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit began by examining the plain language of the ERISA fee shifting
provision.224 It provided that “[i]n any action under this subchapter…by
a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow
a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.”225 Unlike
§ 706(k) and § 1988, the ERISA provision mentioned only “actions” and
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See, e.g., Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc);
Duane M. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 861 F.2d 115, 118 (5th Cir. 1988); Eggers v. Bullitt
Cty. Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir. 1988).
215 See, e.g., Rego v. Westvaco Corp., 319 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2003); Peterson v. Continental
Cas. Co., 282 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2002); Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund for N.
Cal., 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993).
216 See, e.g., Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1987); Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
217 See Davidson, supra note 211, at 444.
218 See infra Part III.B (discussing ERISA cases in greater detail).
219 See Silver, supra note 189, at 407-09.
220 Cann v. Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund, 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993).
221 Id. at 314.
222
Id. at 314-15.
223 Id. at 315
224 Id.
225 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (emphasis added).
214

22

FEE SHIFTING FOR PTAB PROCEEDINGS

not “proceedings.”226 Therefore, the court concluded, the plain language
of the statute limits awards to fees incurred in litigation in court. 227
But the inquiry didn’t end there. Guided by Delaware Valley, the
court next considered the legislative history of ERISA. 228 Congress’s
intention was to promote “the soundness and stability of [pension] plans
with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits.” 229 The court
believed that this objective would not be furthered, and might even be
undermined, by allowing the recovery of fees for administrative
proceedings.230 Nor, the court reasoned, was there anything else in the
legislative history that “supported a nonliteral interpretation of [the term]
‘action’” in the ERISA fee shifting provision. 231 For these reasons, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees.
Over the next decade, several other circuit courts faced the same
question about fee shifting in ERISA cases. Starting with Anderson v.
Proctor & Gamble Co.,232 the Sixth Circuit found the reasoning in Cann
persuasive and held that “ERISA does not authorize recovery of attorney’s
fees for work performed during the administrative exhaustion phase of a
benefits proceedings.”233 Likewise, in Peterson v. Continental Casualty
Co., the Second Circuit limited recovery to attorney’s fees incurred in
court based on the text of the ERISA fee-shifting provision.234 In reaching
this conclusion, the Peterson court relied on dictionary definitions of
“action,” the use of the term “action” in other provisions of the ERISA
statute, and the decisions in Cann and Anderson.235
In Rego v. Westvaco Corporation,236 the Fourth Circuit reached
the same conclusion about fee shifting in ERISA cases. While the Rego
court agreed with the rationale of its sister circuits, it offered an additional
reason for not allowing the recovery of fees for administrative
proceedings.237 Making such fees recoverable, the court suggested, would
encourage parties to retain lawyers to represent them during administrative
proceedings.238 And if lawyers were injected into this process, “it would
establish a far higher degree of formality and lead to more protracted
litigation in a great many cases.”239
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The Eighth Circuit most recently joined this line of cases in Parke
v. First Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.240 The Parke court found it
significant that the ERISA fee shifting provision referred only to “actions,”
not “proceedings.”241 The court also spent a good deal of time
distinguishing Delaware Valley.242 Not only did the environmental
legislation at issue in Delaware Valley have a different congressional
design, the procedural posture of the case was different. As noted by the
Ninth Circuit in Cann,243 the administrative proceedings in Delaware
Valley occurred after the civil action and were necessary to enforce the
already-litigated consent decree, whereas the administrative proceedings
in the ERISA context pre-dated the plaintiff’s lawsuit.244
In all of these ERISA cases, as well as in the HCPA and ADEA
cases mentioned above,245 lower courts begin with the plain language of
the statute and the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey to decide whether
fees for administrative proceedings are recoverable. As discussed in the
next Section, however, when the Federal Circuit confronted this question
regarding fees for PTO proceedings, it skipped the first part of the analysis
and focused only on the inquiry from Webb—whether the administrative
proceedings were mandatory or optional.246 Because the Federal Circuit’s
analysis was flawed, the question whether courts may award fees for PTO
proceedings remains open.
C. Fee Shifting for PTO Proceedings
The AIA vastly expanded the ability to challenge patent validity
through administrative proceedings at the PTO. But even before the AIA,
various administrative proceedings were available to patent owners and
other interested parties—including reissue, ex parte reexamination, and
inter partes reexamination—all of which were used at times in conjunction
with litigation.247 During this pre-AIA era, in a case called PPG Indus.,
Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc., the Federal Circuit
addressed the question about shifting fees for work before the PTO.
1. PPG v. Celanese
PPG Industries, the owner of patents related to electrodeposition
of coating compositions, sued Celanese for infringement. 248 Celanese
uncovered relevant prior art during discovery, and so PPG sought reissue
240
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of the patents-in-suit.249 The district court stayed the federal court action
pending the PTO’s resolution of the reissue proceedings, and Celanese
actively participated in the reissue proceedings as a protestor and
intervenor.250 The PTO refused to reissue PPG’s patents because the
claims were obvious in light of the prior art, and because PPG engaged in
inequitable conduct by intentionally withholding this prior art during the
initial examination. 251 The district court then lifted the stay, entered
judgment for Celanese, and Celanese moved for attorney’s fees under 35
U.S.C. § 285. Although the district court determined the case was
“exceptional” and granted the motion, it did not award the full amount
Celanese requested, including approximately $275,000 for “legal services
rendered before the PTO in opposing PPG’s reissue applications.” 252
Celanese appealed, and the Federal Circuit reversed.
What’s most remarkable about the Federal Circuit’s decision in
PPG is what’s missing from it, namely any reference to the text of § 285
or the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey.253 Instead of starting with the
plain language of the relevant fee shifting provision—as Carey instructs
and as all other circuit courts deciding this question have done—the
Federal Circuit only discussed Webb and the designation of the reissue
proceedings as mandatory or optional.254 The court held that, at least in
this case, the reissue proceedings were mandatory because Celanese had
to participate in them once PPG requested reissue. 255 And even if
considered optional, the court explained, the reissue proceedings were
“useful and of a type ordinarily necessary” as contemplated in Webb.256
Celanese, therefore, was entitled to recover the attorney’s fees incurred
during reissue proceedings before the PTO.
2. Lower Courts’ Application of PPG
Since the Federal Circuit decided PPG almost three decades ago,
this fee shifting issue has garnered little attention. From time-to-time,
district courts have had to decide whether to award fees for work before
the PTO.257 In most of these reported opinions, the courts have allowed
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such fees with little explanation. 258 The courts may have been relying on
PPG, but that is not always clear.
With the passage of the AIA, the popularity of the new post-grant
proceedings, and the rise in fee shifting motions after Octane and
Highmark, courts are likely to face this issue on a much more regular
basis.259 Indeed, a recent district court decision on the matter—Deep Sky
Software, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.—received a good bit of attention
from various commentators and was picked up by several blogs. 260 In
Deep Sky, the plaintiff filed a patent infringement action in 2010, and soon
thereafter the defendant filed a request for inter partes reexamination. 261
The parties filed a joint motion to stay the case pending the outcome of the
reexamination, which the court granted. 262
After the PTO cancelled all the claims of the patent, the district
court lifted the stay and Southwest moved for attorney’s fees under § 285,
including fees for the reexamination. 263 The district court, which had
previously determined the case was exceptional, granted the motion. In so
doing, the court did not examine the text of § 285, consider its legislative
history, or discuss any of the Supreme Court cases on point. Instead,
relying on PPG, the court held that “the reexamination proceedings
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attorney’s fees) associated with PTAB proceedings. See Credit Acceptance Corp., v.
Westlake Servs., LLC, CV 13-01523 SJO (MRWx), at 5-6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016). In
Credit Acceptance, the patent owner sued for infringement, and the defendant successfully
challenged the patent in CBM before the PTAB. The defendant then sought to recover
costs associated with the CBM, namely $73,200 in filing fees. Id. at 5. Despite being the
“prevailing party,” the district court held that defendant could not recover the CBM-related
filing fees pursuant to the Central District of California’s Local Rules, which only allowed
fees paid to the “Clerk” to be recoverable. Id. at 6. Since the $73,200 in fees was paid to
the PTO, and not the court clerk, they were not taxable costs. Id.
260 See, e.g., Gregory S. Cordrey, District Court Awards Defendant Its IPR-Related Fees
Under § 285, PATENT LAWYER BLOG, http://patentlaw.jmbm.com/2015/09/district-courtawards-defendan.html (Sept. 1, 2015); Kevin Penton, Southwest Wins Attorney Fees for
Patent
Re-examination
Period,
LAW
360,
http://www.law360.com/articles/693876/southwest-wins-atty-fees-for-patent-reexamination-period (Aug. 21, 2015); Hans Smith, Attorney Fees for Post-Grant Patent
Challenge Proceedings Before the USPTO May Be Recoverable in Exceptional Cases
Under
35
U.S.C.
§
285,
IP
INTELLIGENCE,
http://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2015/08/26/attorney-fees-for-post-grant-patentchallenge-proceedings-before-the-uspto-may-be-recoverable-in-exceptional-cases-under35-u-s-c-%C2%A7-285/ (Aug. 26, 2015).
261
Deep Sky, Case No. 10-cv-1234, at 1.
262 See Deep Sky Software, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., Case No. 10-cv-1234-CAB
(KSC), at 1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015).
263 Id. at 2.
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essentially substituted for work that would otherwise have been done
before this court,” and therefore Southwest was entitled to those fees. 264
Although Deep Sky involved pre-AIA administrative proceedings
(i.e., inter partes reexamination), no doubt district courts will approach the
fee shifting question similarly with respect to IPR, PGR, and CBM. Stated
simply, courts will follow PPG and allow prevailing parties to recover fees
incurred during PTO proceedings. Perhaps from a policy perspective the
Federal Circuit got it right in PPG, but its legal analysis was unsound. The
final Part of this Article therefore makes two suggestions for addressing
this problem going forward. First, it calls on either an en banc Federal
Circuit or the Supreme Court to revisit PPG, and second it urges Congress
to address this matter.
IV.

The Future of Fee Shifting for PTAB Proceedings
A. The Judiciary Should Revisit PPG

When the Federal Circuit decided PPG almost thirty years ago,
the language of § 285 was the same as it is today: “The court in exceptional
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 265 This
language should have been the Federal Circuit’s starting point, as the
Supreme Court explicated in Carey and its progeny.266 Of course, the
“rule” announced in Carey is not unique to the circumstances of that case.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that courts begin with the
language of the statute. 267 The Federal Circuit itself has acknowledged
this maxim time and again. 268
Yet, for unexplained reasons, the PPG court skipped this critical
first step when interpreting § 285. Maybe a court would choose not to
address the statutory language if it were sufficiently clear. But if the
statute’s language was clear, then why would the parties be litigating about
it in the first place? In the end, whether such a hypothetical situation might
arise in some other case is neither here nor there because the language of
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Id. at 4. The district court did cite one other Federal Circuit case, Cent. Soya Co. v.
Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983), for the proposition that
attorney’s fees may include “those sums that the prevailing party incurs in the preparation
for and performance of legal services related to the suit.” But Soya is not on point. In
Soya, the question was whether courts may award expenses—such as fees for paralegals,
expert witness fees, photocopying charges, travel expenses, etc.—or whether § 285 is
limited to attorney’s fees. Id. at 1577-78. Soya did not address the question whether
attorney’s fees for administrative proceedings are recoverable under § 285.
265 35 U.S.C. § 285.
266 See supra Part III.A.
267 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
172 (2001); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Federal
Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 69 (2007).
268 See, e.g., Federal Nat. Mortgage Ass’n v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute.”); Associated
Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“To determine
Congressional intent, we begin, of course, with the language of the statutes at issue.”);
Demko v. United States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Statutory interpretation
begins with the language of the statute itself.”).
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§ 285 is not clear—it does not unambiguously allow prevailing parties to
recover fees for administrative proceedings.
To the contrary, unlike sections 706(k) and 1988 of the Civil
Rights Act, § 285 makes no mention of “proceedings.” 269 Rather, the
statute says only that courts may award fees in “cases.” The term “case”
is synonymous with “action,”270 and courts have interpreted “action” to
mean a proceeding in court, not an administrative proceeding. 271 A “case,”
moreover, is defined as “a question contested before a court of justice” or
“an aggregate of facts which furnishes occasion for the exercise of the
jurisdiction of a court of justice.”272 In short, the statutory language of §
285 does not support the Federal Circuit’s conclusion in PPG that fees
may be awarded for PTO proceedings.
But even where, as here, the statute is silent, courts may still award
fees for administrative proceedings if that’s what Congress intended.273
The purpose of § 285 is “to compensate the prevailing party for its
monetary outlays in the prosecution or defense of the suit.” 274 To be sure,
allowing prevailing parties in patent litigation to recover fees for PTO
proceedings would be “compensatory.” However, it’s impossible to say—
as the Supreme Court did in Delaware Valley—that Congress intended for
these fees to be recoverable because, at the time § 285 was enacted, these
PTO proceedings did not even exist.275
Because neither the plain language of § 285 nor its legislative
history support the recovery of fees for work before the PTO, the Federal
Circuit’s legal analysis in PPG was wrong. Under the Supreme Court’s
framework, the Federal Circuit never should have reached the question
whether PTO proceedings are mandatory or optional because there was no
explicit or implicit statutory authority for awarding fees for administrative
proceedings.276 Thus, the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of the
Federal Circuit should revisit and reverse PPG.
For all its flaws, however, the PPG decision is sound as a matter
of policy, especially in light of the objectives of the AIA. One purpose of
the AIA was to address the country’s bad patent problem, which Congress
269

42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000(e)-5(k).
CASE, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10TH ED. 2014) (defining “case” as “[a] civil or
criminal proceeding, action, cause, suit, or controversy, at law or in equity”) (emphasis
added).
271 See, e.g., Peterson v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 282 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Used in a
statute, the term ‘action’ traditionally connotes a formal adversarial proceeding under the
jurisdiction of a court of law.”); Cann v. Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund, 989 F.2d 316,
316 (9th Cir. 1993) (“action” generally refers to “proceedings in court, not administrative
proceedings even though necessary and valuable”).
272 BLACK’S, supra note 269 (emphasis added).
273 See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
559, (1986).
274 Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 541 F.Supp. 1198, 1201 (D.Mass.1982) (“The
compensatory purpose of § 285 is best served if the prevailing party is allowed to recover
his reasonable expenses in prosecuting the entire action.”).
275 Instead, the legislative history indicates that Congress believed fee shifting in patent
cases would “enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer” and deter
willful infringement “by anyone thinking that all he would be required to pay if he loses
the suit would be a royalty.” S. Rep. No. 1503 (1946), in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1386, 1387.
276 See supra Part III.A (setting out the Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing fee
shifting for administrative proceedings).
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believed was hampering innovation and technological advancement.277 To
that end, Congress created PTAB proceedings as a quicker and less
expensive alternative to district court litigation. 278 Congress’s goal, in
other words, was to encourage the use of PTAB proceedings to invalidate
bad patents.
While various means could be used to encourage PTAB
challenges, fee shifting is an important one. Simply put, when there’s a
possibility of recovering attorney’s fees, parties are more likely to seek
PTAB review in the first place, and more likely to pursue such challenges
to a final decision.279 On the other hand, if there’s no possibility of fee
shifting, parties may choose a different path. They may challenge a patent
only in federal court (i.e., not at the PTAB), settle the case (thereby
allowing an invalid patent to remain in force), or not challenge the patent
at all.280
In short, the policy underlying PPG makes good sense because
allowing prevailing parties to recoup attorney’s fees for PTAB
proceedings furthers the aims of the AIA. But even assuming the Federal
Circuit wanted to award fees for work at the PTAB, its hands are tied by
the plain language of § 285, the statute’s legislative history, and Supreme
Court precedent. Accordingly, it is up to Congress to provide a legislative
fix.
B. Congress Should Allow for Recovery of PTAB Fees
Since 2013, several bills have been introduced in Congress
proposing broader fee shifting for patent cases. 281 Many provisions in
these bills have been the subject of significant debate, including whether
fee shifting should be mandatory or discretionary, how to recover fees
from the “real party in interest,” whether to adopt a one-way or two-way
fee shifting scheme, the standard for fee shifting, and whether certain
entities (e.g., universities) should be exempted from the fee shifting
provisions.282 Yet, none of these bills tackles the question whether
prevailing parties should be able to recover fees incurred during PTAB
proceedings.
If Congress ultimately adopts one of these fee shifting bills, it
should permit courts to award fees for IPR, PGR, and CBM (e.g., by
including the word “proceedings” in the statute). Congress should also
277

See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S5409-10 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Schumer) (“[T]he bill streamlines review of patents to ensure that the poor-quality patents
can be weeded out through administrative review rather than costly litigation.”); 157 Cong.
Rec. S5433 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Se. Grassley) (arguing that post-grant
administrative review will “protect inventor’s rights,” “strengthen patent quality,” “reduce
costs,” “curb litigation abuses”, and “improve certainty for investors and innovators”).
278 See Matal, supra note 158, at 653.
279 See supra Part I (discussing how different fee shifting regimes influence litigation
conduct).
280 See id.
281 See supra Part II.D (introducing various fee shifting proposals).
282
See Patent Progress, Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation,
available at http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patentprogresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (collecting and summarizing patent reform bills
that have been introduced since 2013).
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provide district courts some guidance on when such fees are appropriately
granted. For example, district courts might be more likely to award fees
for PTAB proceedings if they simplified the litigation or substituted for
work that otherwise would have been done before the court. 283 On the
other hand, if PTAB proceedings were duplicative or brought for
harassment purposes, recovery should not be allowed. 284 While such
decisions should be left to the discretion of the court, laying out factors in
the statute for the court to consider would be helpful. To be completely
upfront, I am not advocating for the passage of any of these fee shifting
bills. But if Congress decides to revamp § 285, it should take that
opportunity to clarify this issue about recouping administrative fees.
Even in the event Congress does not pass comprehensive fee
shifting legislation, it should still address this issue. Patent litigants who
employ PTAB proceedings in a way that advances the AIA’s objectives
ought to recover their attorney’s fees.285 To allow for that, Congress would
need to amend § 285—at the very least—to refer to “proceedings” in the
text of the statute. Ideally, as noted above, Congress would also provide
some guidance to help courts discern when fees for administrative work
are warranted and when they are not.
One last suggestion is that Congress consider granting the PTAB
power to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, as it has done for a
number of other agencies. 286 That way, parties who litigate only at the
PTAB (and not also in federal court) can recover fees. This is important
because, while most IPRs and CBMs involve a parallel federal court

See, e.g., Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 562 (“We agree that participation in these
proceedings was crucial to the vindication of Delaware Valley’s rights under the consent
decree and find that compensation for these activities was entirely proper and well within
the ‘zone of discretion’ afforded to the District Court.”); Deep Sky Software, Inc. v.
Southwest Airlines Co., Case No. 10-cv-1234-CAB (KSC), at 4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015).
284 See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 932-33 (2015)
(discussing how parties have abused PTAB proceedings); Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note
161, at 55 (explaining that some PTAB petitions may be used for harassment and delay).
285 See Carey, 447 U.S. at 66 (“It would be anomalous to award fees to the complainant
who is unsuccessful or only partially successful in obtaining state or local remedies, but to
deny an award to the complainant who is successful in fulfilling Congress’ plan that federal
policies be vindicated at the state or local level.”).
286 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) (“In any administrative proceeding
brought under this section, or any court proceeding arising therefrom, or any civil action
under this section, the administrative law judge or the court, as the case may be, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs.”) (emphasis added); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3) (“Whenever an order is issued sustaining the complainant’s charges
under this subsection, a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses
(including attorney’s fees) as determined by the Commission to have been reasonably
incurred by the miner, applicant for employment or representative of miners for, or in
connection with, the institution and prosecution of such proceedings shall be assessed
against the person committing such violation.”) (emphasis added); Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 928(a)-(b) (“If . . . the person seeking benefits
shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attorney at law in successful prosecution of
his claim, there shall be awarded . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee against the employer or
carrier in an amount approved by the deputy commissioner, Board, or court, as the case
may be.”) (emphasis added); Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. § 41305(e) (authorizing the
Federal Maritime Commission to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in
any action brought under the act).
283
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suit,287 some do not. Moreover, with respect to PGRs, there’s less likely
to be parallel litigation since they must be initiated within nine months of
the patent’s issuance. 288 Allowing the PTAB to award fees would further
the AIA’s objective of encouraging parties to use PTAB proceedings as a
substitute for, rather than in addition to, federal court litigation. 289 Plus,
having the agency decide fee motions avoids the difficulty courts face
when assessing a fee request for work conducted before a different
tribunal.290
Conclusion
The PTAB is transforming the way patent litigation is conducted
in the United States. Where patents were once litigated solely in federal
court, today the PTAB plays a key role in resolving patent disputes. While
PTAB proceedings are far less expensive than federal court litigation, 291
parties still incur significant attorney’s fees adjudicating before the PTO.
These administrative fees should be recoverable by prevailing patent
litigants, but Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear that § 285’s plain
language and legislative history preclude such an award. Therefore, in
furtherance of the AIA’s objective of encouraging PTAB proceedings as
a substitute for federal court litigation, Congress should enact legislation
entitling parties who prevail at the PTAB to recover attorney’s fees.
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See Love & Ambwani, supra note 151, at 103.
Vishnubhakat, supra note 116.
289 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1284-85 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the PTAB was meant to serve as a “surrogate for district court
litigation”); Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 161, at 70 (noting the “intended uses of IPR
and CBM review as substitutes for federal court litigation”).
290 See, e.g., PPG Indus. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties, Co., 658 F.Supp. 555, 561 (W.D.
Ky. 1987) (“[I]t would be very difficult or almost impossible for the court to award those
fees accurately regarding the conduct of a separate action before a different kind of
tribunal.”). Notably, the PTAB did award attorney’s fees recently, albeit in a different
context. In RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time LLC, the PTAB ordered the patent
owner to pay $13,500 in attorney’s fees as a sanction for violating a protective order. See
IPR 2015-011750, 01751 & 01752. In so doing, the PTAB relied on C.F.R. § 42.12, which
allows the Board to impose sanctions against a party for “misconduct.”
291 Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 161, at 59 (“Thus far, the new AIA proceedings do
appear to be substantially cheaper than district court litigation.”).
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